摘要
Wen和Ma提出了一个基于传统PKI体制上的聚合签名方案,并认为该方案在随机预言机模型下是可证明安全的。但本文指出Wen-Ma方案是可以普遍伪造的,敌手既可以伪造某一个签名人的(普通)数字签名又可以伪造多个签名人的聚合签名。另外,Dai等人提出了一个适用于移动商务的基于身份的数字签名方案,但杜红珍发现该方案是不安全的,并给出了该方案的两种伪造攻击。
Wen and Ma presented an aggregate signature scheme in the public key infrastructure setting and claimed their scheme is provably secure in the random oracle model. But this paper pointed out Wen-Ma scheme was universally forgeable, and an adversary could forge not only any signer’s ordinary signatures but also aggregate signatures produced by many different signers. In addition, Dai et al. proposed an identity-based sinature scheme. DU Hong-zhen found out their scheme was insecure and gave two forgery attacks on the scheme.
出处
《计算机应用研究》
CSCD
北大核心
2010年第5期1879-1881,共3页
Application Research of Computers
基金
国家自然科学基金资助项目(60873191)
宝鸡文理学院重点科研项目(ZK0952)