摘要
论文研究了战略网络核心企业在缺乏伙伴企业的实际业务能力、服务成本等方面信息的情况下,通过信息甄别原理设计不同的报酬合同来让伙伴企业选择,从而根据伙伴企业选择结果来判断其真实的能力或类型,避免了逆向选择问题的发生。
It is investigated that,with the absence of such information of partners to the core firm as their real capability and their service cost and so forth,the core firm uses the principle of information screening to design different payment contracts to 1et partners select,and hence he can judge their true information in terms of their selecting result and avoid the problems of their adverse selection.
出处
《微计算机信息》
2010年第12期42-44,共3页
Control & Automation
关键词
信息甄别
战略网络
逆向选择
分离均衡
Screening
strategic network
adverse selection
separating equilibrium