国际体系结构与国家行为:一个博弈理论模型

International System Structure and State Behavior:A Game Theoretical Model

国际体系结构特征对国家间利益分配和国家行为存在重要影响。在单极世界中,参与国的参与剩余将作为垄断租金转移给国家极;两极体系将导致利益反向再分配,即国家极的主导者剩余将作为租金转移给其他参与国家;意识形态冲突、文明冲突和经济地理邻近构成了国际政治交易成本的主要来源,它们决定了国家间政治结盟的基本分布特征。"中心—边缘"命题中存在的边缘地区发展陷阱以及战后日本发展等理论和现实问题,都可以用不同国际体系结构下的国家间博弈进行解释。

International system structure will influence the behaviors of states and the distribution of benefits. Theoretical model showed that in the monopolized international system, the participation surplus of participants would serve as the rents of monopoly power. However, when in the oligarchic international system, distribution of benefits is reversed, that is, the leaders＂ surplus of political oligarchy will transfer to the participants. Ideological conflict, clash of civilizations, economic geographic proximity are the three main sources of political transactional cost, by incorporated them in the extended spatial model, basic distribution of political alliance is shown. Based on these conclusions, the development trap of developing countries in the proposition of ＂center - periphery＂ and Japan＇s postwar development is reinterpreted and discussed.