基于销售定额的信息甄别模型和差别工资

Screening Model and Wage Discrimination based on Sale Quota

根据不同能力类型的销售人员具有不同形状的效用曲线这一假设,建立了信息甄别模型来研究销售人员的报酬激励机制,证明了分离均衡是该模型唯一的均衡,并且优于混同均衡,得出以差别工资制取代统一工资制可以提高管理效率,减少了雇佣双方由于信息不对称带来的无谓损失,其结果具有一定的理论和实际意义。

According to the different abilities of different types of sales personnel with the assumption that the shape of utility curves, established screening model to study the sale of a reward incentive mechanism, proved the only separating e- quilibrium is the equilibrium of the model, and better than the. pooling equilibrium, come to replace the unified wage differ- ential wage system can improve management efficiency, reduce employers and employees as deadweight loss caused by asym- metric information, the result has some theoretical and practical significance.