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股权分置改革后控股股东代理行为实证分析 被引量:7

Empirical analysis of controlling shareholder's agency behavior after equity division reform
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摘要 本文借助所构建的控股股东代理行为指数,对股权分置改革后的控股股东代理行为进行了实证研究,研究结果表明:控股股东通过控制上市公司董事会影响上市公司的独立性,间接侵害上市公司和中小股东利益的行为比较普遍;大股东间的股权制衡对控股股东代理行为有抑制作用;增加独立董事比例、保障中小股东的投票权,减少隶属于控股股东单位的公司董事数量,建立适度规模的董事会有利于抑制控股股东代理行为。 The paper adopts index of controlling shareholder's agency behavior constructed to study controlling shareholder's agency behavior after equity division reform empirically.The results shows that:Controlling shareholders affects listed firms'independence by controlling the board of directors,the behavior of indirectly evading against the interests of listed firms and small and medium-sized shareholders is common;the Power Balance among larger Shareholders is of inhibition for controlling shareholder's agency behavior.Increasing the proportion of independent directors and voting rights aimed to protect small shareholders,abating the number of directors attached to the controlling shareholder,constructing an appropriate scale of the board of directors would benefit to inhibit the controlling shareholder agency behavior.
作者 宋力 胡运权
出处 《管理评论》 CSSCI 北大核心 2010年第4期26-33,共8页 Management Review
基金 国家社会科学基金项目(05BJY004) 教育部社会科学基金项目(09YJA630101)
关键词 控股股东 代理行为指数 股权制衡 公司治理 controlling shareholder index of agency behavior the Power Balance corporate governance
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