摘要
本文从基金经理权责出发,探讨基金管理公司治理模式。研究表明,投资决策权需要在基金经理和基金管理公司投资决策层之间适当分配,并且在数量方面给出了一个可操作的参照指标。实证结论显示,共同持股行为与基金管理公司业绩成倒U形关系,与基金管理公司风险成U形关系。而且,在一个理想共同持股区间内,基金管理公司可以使收益最大化而风险最小化。
This paper made a constructive attempt and mainly focused on the relationship between performance and risk and corporate governance structure from the power of fund manager. Through analysis of the power of fund manager, the paper make such a conclusion that the relationship between concentration on stocks and performance forms a inverted U-shape and the relationship between concentration on stocks and risk forms a U-shape. Therefore we propose decision-making power need be allocated to the fund manager and the the fund management company. At the same time we presented countermeasures and suggestions which is technical feasible.
出处
《经济管理》
CSSCI
北大核心
2010年第5期121-125,共5页
Business and Management Journal ( BMJ )
关键词
公司治理
基金管理公司
基金经理
权力制衡
决策权
corporate governance
fund management company
fund manager
separation of powers
decision-making power