论监考博弈中纯策略纳什均衡的变异与修正

An Aberrant Pure-Strategy Nash Equilibrium for the Invigilating Game and Some Amending Measures

近年来,众多实证调查表明国内不少高校大学生考试作弊已猖獗成风。针对该问题,通过对监考博弈的重新审视,发现原本无纯策略纳什均衡的监考博弈因"-∞的违纪处分、一次博弈、信息不对称"而发生变异,变异后产生了"监考教师折中策略、考生作弊"的纯策略纳什均衡,从而揭开了"考试作弊之风"的面纱,并针对性地提出了"弱化-∞的违纪处分、建立监考重复博弈、设计相关保障机制"的三项修正措施。

In recent years,surveys have indicated that there is an alarming increase in test-cheating behavior among undergraduates.Many studies have revealed that just like the game of ＂Matching Pennies＂,there is no Pure-Strategy Nash Equilibrium（PSNE） for the invigilating game between invigilators students,however,in this paper it is figured out that due to the factors of ＂-∞＂ punishments,one-time game and asymmetric information,the action profile that invigilators pick ＂balanced strategy＂ and students ＂cheat＂ turns out to be the PSNE for the game,thus unveiling that the widespread test-cheating is the aberrant PSNE.Then accordingly three countermeasures are put forward： diluting the harsh punishment of ＂-∞＂,making the game as iterated one,as well as designing some guarantee mechanisms.