威慑补充与“赔偿减刑”

Deterrence Supplementation and "Lenient Sentencing upon Compensation"

借助法律经济学威慑理论的分析框架,从"资产不足"和"威慑不足"两类论证刑罚必要性的基本依据出发,在制度效率的层面论说了"赔偿减刑"的可行性、积极价值与潜在问题。指出:尽管传统的部门法理论通常强调刑罚和民事侵权责任之间的区别和界限,但在实现行为威慑意义上,两者背后有共通的效率逻辑,认识这种逻辑有助于人们更好地理解"赔偿减刑"这种介于民刑交界地带的法律现象,以及包括救济、报应和公平在内的诸多传统法理学问题。

Utilizing the analytical framework provided by law and economics' theory of deterrence,and in particular the thoughts on two basic justifications for the necessity of criminal punishments (i.e.the 'insolvency' problem and the 'inadequate deterrent' problem),this article discusses,from the angle of systematic efficiency,the feasibility,advantages as well as potential problems of 'lenient sentencing upon compensation.' The author argues that criminal punishment and civil liability for tort,despite the commonly emphasized sectorial differences and boundaries between public law and private law,do share certain underlying rationale of efficiency.Recognition of such rationale is conducive to a better understanding of 'lenient sentencing upon compensation,' a relatively novel judicial practice that lies in the border area between civil law and criminal law,as well as remedial and retributive justice,equity and other related traditional jurisprudential issues.