基于金融契约的控制权配置对公司内部治理影响的研究

Effect of Allocations of Control Rights on Internal Corporate Governance Based on Financial Contracting

以中国国有控股公司治理问题为导向,从金融契约视角,探讨了通过控制权的动态配置来激励企业家时相关因素对财务结构的影响。引入了受控制权影响的干预成本、风险等变量,分析了债务比率与股东控制权、流动性风险、道德风险和投资者风险偏好以及边际干预成本之间的相互关系,以期求得较为理想的财务结构。研究得出当企业面临的流动性冲击、道德风险和投资者的风险规避系数增加时,企业的债务比率应该减少。由于干预成本对股东的边际效应影响了股东控制权的大小,从而改变了不同项目风险下控制权的分配,因此认为适度的债务水平是实现对企业家刚性约束的必要条件。

Oriented by the problem of Chinese state-owned enterprises governance,from the perspective of financing contract,the paper studies the impact of relevant factors on financial structure through dynamic allocation of control rights to stimulateentrepreneurs.The paper introduces variables of intervention cost and risk influenced by control right,and analyzes the relations of debt ratio,allocation of control right,liquidity risk,moral hazard,and investors＇ absolute risk aversion and intervention cost,and expect to get ideal financial structure.The results show that with the increase of liquidity risk,moral hazard and shareholder＇s risk aversion coefficient,the enterprises＇ debt ratio decreases.Because intervention cost influences the control rights of shareholders,allocation of control right under different project risk changes.The implication of the paper is that moderate debt ratio may achieve the tough constraint on the entrepreneur＇s decision.