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基于价值和费率的信用担保融资契约模型 被引量:1

Credit Guarantee Financing Contracts Model Based on Value and Rate
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摘要 通过考虑反担保措施价值和担保费率2个因素构建信用担保契约模型,从理论上证明:当低风险的中小企业期望收益为零时,不同风险类型的企业所接受的担保费率和提供的反担保措施价值都相等;当低风险中小企业期望收益不为零时,高风险企业愿意接受较高的担保费率并提供较低的反担保措施价值,低风险企业愿意接受较低的担保费率并提供较高的反担保措施价值,此时信用担保机构可以使用担保费率和反担保措施价值作为甄别企业风险类型的手段。通过风险水平不同的中小企业对担保契约的选择,使担保机构能够准确判断企业风险类型,从而使担保契约的确定更加科学合理。 Through the credit guarantee contract model considered with the guarantee rate and counter guarantee measure value,it is proved in theory that when the expected revenue of lower risky SME is zero,the guarantee rates accepted by the high risky SME and the low risky SME are equal and the counter-guarantee measure value provided by them are the same too;when the expected revenue of lower risky SME is non-negative,the higher risky SME are willing to accept lower guarantee rate and provide higher counter-guarantee measure value,while the lower risky SME are just the opposite.The credit guarantee institutions can utilize guarantee rate and counter-guarantee measure value as the mechanism to separate the risk type of SME.It can judge the risky type of SME exactly through SME with different risk selecting guarantee contract in order to make the guarantee contract more scientific and reasonable.
出处 《管理学报》 CSSCI 2010年第5期755-759,769,共6页 Chinese Journal of Management
基金 辽宁省科学技术计划资助项目(2008401010) 教育部高等学校博士学科点专项科研基金资助项目(20090042110033) 辽宁省社会科学规划基金资助项目(L09BJY016)
关键词 信息不对称 信用担保契约 担保费率 反担保措施价值 asymmetric information credit guarantee contract guarantee rate counter-guarantee measure value
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