发展中国家财政分权下的减贫政策瞄准机制研究

Targeting of Antipoverty Policies under Fiscal Decentralization in Developing Countries

研究发展中国家财政分权下的减贫政策需要考虑地方政府在减贫政策实施中的激励机制和行为模式。一些国家的地方政府由中央政府任命产生,由于中央政府监督的缺陷,地方政府在减贫政策实施中会存在虚增成本和地下交易行为;另外一些国家的地方政府由地方居民选举产生,但是受居民文化水平和政治觉悟差异的影响,地方政府容易被富人利益集团左右,减贫政策实施中更多考虑富人利益。通过模型分别描述了任命制和选举制下地方政府的减贫行为,认为任命制下的大规模减贫瞄准效果较好,选举制下的小规模减贫针对性较强,并据此为发展中国家减贫政策的有效实施提供了建议。

It needs considering local governments＇ incentives and behavior patterns in antipoverty program delivery to study the antipoverty policies under fiscal decentralization in developing countries.In some developing countries,local governments＇ officials are appointed by the central government.Due to supervisory defects of central government,local governments＇ officials seek illegal income through inflated costs and underground transaction in antipoverty program delivery.In other developing countries,local governments＇ officials are elected by local residents.But due to low levels of literacy and political consciousness of the residents,local governments are easily captured by the rich,and give more attention to the rich in antipoverty program delivery.This article describes the antipoverty behavior of local government in appointment system and election system respectively.It argues that large-scale antipoverty policies are better-targeting in appointment system,and vice versa in election system.It also provides some suggestions for the effective implementation of antipoverty policies in developing countries.