摘要
威廉姆斯将"道德"与"运气"并置,构成"道德运气"这个在他看来自相矛盾的修辞,意在揭示道德免于运气的努力不可能成功。内格尔则在此启发之下着力探讨运气对道德的深刻影响,将"道德运气"理解为一个可以揭示道德评价之悖论性质的概念。如果说内格尔通过分析运气对道德的具体影响,给我们提供了一幅道德行为完全处于运气之包围和渗透中的生动画面,那么,威廉姆斯则通过展示运气的体验在人类伦理生活中的重要性,而从根本处撼动了道德的基础。
In order to illustrate the impossibility of morality immune to luck, Bernard Williams juxtaposes "morality" and "luck" and introduces the expression "moral luck" as an oxymoron. Otherwise, Thomas Nagel takes "moral luck" as a concept that expresses the paradoxical phenomenon in moral assessment. Where Nagel gives us a vivid picture of moral action totally surrounded by luck through concrete analyses, Williams radically shakes the basis of morality through revealing the importance of the experience of luck in human ethical life.
出处
《北京大学学报(哲学社会科学版)》
CSSCI
北大核心
2010年第3期74-84,共11页
Journal of Peking University(Philosophy and Social Sciences)
关键词
道德运气
合理辩护
践行作用
伦理关切
moral Luck
rational justification
agency
ethical concern