摘要
Hyle(质素)作为胡塞尔感知现象学的核心概念,在《观念I》中得到了清楚明白的阐述,但随着时间现象学的研究视角的引入,质素呈现出一系列彼此之间难以协调甚至相互冲突的现象并最终被归结为"在体验之中的非自我"或"非自我的主体性"这种谜一般的表述。质素之谜也让现象学界争论不休,甚至让一些现象学家对揭示谜底的可能性表示失望。胡塞尔晚年在"C手稿"中以"原活当下"为立足点发现了质素通过"结对联想"、"相似组的建立"、"内在材料的融合"以及"形式联想"等方式进入时间化过程的现象,并通过对"原自我"和"原非我"的区分和联系的阐明在质素的幽暗处投下了一道亮光。
Hyle as a key concept of Husserl's phenomenology of perception has been clearly elaborated in Ideas I. But with the introduction of the research perspective of time phenomenology, Hyle presents a series of mutually inconsistent and even conflicting phenomena and in the end results in such an enigmatic expression as "Not-I in experience" or "the subjectivity of Not-I". The enigma of Hyle has also put the phenomenological circle into endless arguments, so that some of the phenomenologists have expressed their disappointment about the possibility of disclosing the enigma. Based on "originally living at present", Hussed in his later years has in his "Manuscript C" found out the phenomenon of Hyle entering temporization by way of "pairing association", "the establishment of similar group", "the fusion of internal materials", "formal association" etc. and has therefore cast light on the darkness of Hyle through the elucidation of the distinguishing and connection between "original I" and "original Not-I".
出处
《江苏行政学院学报》
CSSCI
北大核心
2010年第3期30-35,共6页
The Journal of Jiangsu Administration Institute
基金
国家社会科学基金项目(项目批准号:06CZX017)的阶段性研究成果
关键词
胡塞尔
质素
C手稿
非自我
时间现象学
E. Husserl
Hyle
Manuscript C
Not-I
Phenomenology of Time