摘要
本文利用世界银行在中国18个城市1483家制造业企业的调查数据,研究了不同所有制结构下经理人薪酬激励对企业创新投入和产出两方面的影响。文章分别用企业研发参与、研发投资密度和几个创新产出指标,在控制了一系列影响创新的因素之后,得出了如下的主要结论:(1)无论从投入还是产出看,国有企业都更具有创新性;(2)对CEO的薪酬激励能促进企业进行创新;(3)国有产权降低了激励对创新的促进作用。用工具变量控制内生性以后,以上结论依然成立。
We use a World Bank survey of 1483 manufacturing finns from 18 Chinese cities over the period 2000 to 2002 to empirically examine the roles of CEO incentives on finns ＇ innovation activities under different ownership structure, for both innovative input and output. Innovation measures include finn R＆D decision, R＆D intensity and a number of innovation output measures. After controlling for other co - factors, we find the following main results ： （ 1 ） SOEs are more innovative than private firms, in terms of both innovation input and output; （2） CEO incentive schemes increase firm innovation; （3） The effect of the incentives on innovation is deteriorated for SOE finns. The main results prove robust after controlling for endogenity with instrument variables. Some important policy implications are discussed.
出处
《经济研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2010年第5期55-67,共13页
Economic Research Journal
关键词
所有制
创新
薪酬激励
Ownership Structure
R＆D
Incentive
