特权的两种形式

Two Forms of Privilege

在《拒斥后果主义》一书中,谢弗勒提出了"以行为者为中心"的特权这一概念,特权否认行为者总是必须产生最佳后果,而允许行为者给予其自身利益以更大分量的关注,同时,谢弗勒又通过限制行为者的特权,为行为者设置了一定的道德要求。谢弗勒认为,他提出的"特权"观念避免了后果主义所遭受到的"个人完整性"(personal integrity)的异议,使得道德理论为行为者设置的要求不像后果主义那样严苛。本文将围绕"谢弗勒的特权观念是否提出了适度的道德要求"这一问题展开。通过分析谢弗勒的"特权"的两种形式(分别简称为ACP1和ACP2),试图表明,谢弗勒通过限制行为者的特权而提出的道德要求过低,因而无法有效地解决道德冲突的问题。

In The Rejection of Consequentialism,Scheffler brings up the concept of privilege with the actor as the center.He holds that privilege allows the actor to give much concern for his interest rather than require him to produce the best result.At the same time,Scheffler holds that the actor should have limited privilege and follow some moral criteria.Scheffler also holds that his concept of 'privilege' avoids the disputes over 'personal integrity' induced by consequentialism and this moral theory does not have so strict requirements as consequentialism.The paper focuses on a discussion of 'whether Scheffler's concept of privilege has proper moral requirements' and analyzes the two forms of his privilege(ACP1 and ACP2),and concludes that because his moral requirements are inadequate,they cannot solve the problems of moral conflicts.