期刊文献+

规模经济不需要行政性进入壁垒的保护 被引量:3

ECONOMIES OF SCALE DO NOT NEED A SHIELD OF ADMINISTRATIVE BARRIERS TO ENTRY
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摘要 我国的很多垄断性产业处于市场内生性的结构性进入壁垒和政府设置壁垒的双重保护下。政府设置进入壁垒的原因被认为是保护在位企业的规模经济。本文的分析表明,这类企业的规模本身就构成了进入壁垒,并不需要行政性壁垒的保护。为弱化行政性进入壁垒下企业内生的低效率,有必要放松乃至解除行政性壁垒,但这并不必然导致竞争性低效率。 Many Chinese monopolistic industries are in the double shield of structural barriers to entry and administrative barriers to entry (ABE) . The reason for setting up ABE is considered to preserve the economies of scale. This study proposes that the ABE setting is unnecessary, for the scale of incumbent firms is a barrier to entry for potential firms. To lower endogenous inefficiency, the deregulation of entry is required, which does not necessarily lead to competitive inefficiency.
作者 孟昌
出处 《经济理论与经济管理》 CSSCI 北大核心 2010年第5期37-43,共7页 Economic Theory and Business Management
关键词 规模经济 行政性进入壁垒 竞争性低效率 放松进入管制 economies of scale administrative barrier to entry low efficiency of competition deregulation of entry
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共引文献844

同被引文献42

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二级引证文献142

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