摘要
文章利用拓展LLSV模型分析大股东效用函数变化,推测大股东持股比例、流通程度、股权集中度等与盈余管理幅度之间的关系。实证结果表明,随着股权流通程度的提高,大股东的盈余管理程度在降低,并且在股改后盈余管理的方向更加趋向于正向盈余管理;实施盈余操纵需要管理层的配合,在股权集中度较高的公司大股东更有能力实施盈余操纵。
This paper uses the LLSV extension model to analyze changes in utility function of major shareholders,and then predicts respectively the relationships of the share ratio of major shareholders,degree of circulation,ownership concentration to the extent of earnings management. The empirical evidence supports that:(1) extent of earnings management by major shareholders decreases with the increase of degree of circulation,and major shareholders tend to adopt positive earnings management; (2) to manipulate earnings needs cooperation of the management and it's more possible to manipulate earnings in the higher degree of ownership concentration.
出处
《上海立信会计学院学报》
北大核心
2010年第2期8-16,共9页
Journal of Shanghai Lixin University of Commerce
基金
国家社科基金项目"股权分置改革的会计后果及其监控研究"(07BJY029)
对外经济贸易大学211工程项目"国际化经营与企业透明度监管研究"(73200032)
关键词
股权分置改革
大股东行为
盈余管理
reform of non-tradable shares
major shareholders' behavior
earnings management