中国式财政分权体制下地方政府财力事权关系类型研究

Taxonomies of Relationship Between Fiscal Capacities and Administrative Affairs of Local Governments in Chinese- Style Fiscal Federalism

中国式财政分权在成功地为地方财政松绑的同时,也造成了我国政府治理的"事权属地化"。各级政府财力事权不匹配,直接导致了我国地方财政实践中存在财力-事权倒挂现象。根据事权来源不同,事权可划分为显性(法定)事权和隐性(委托性)事权,而结合地方财力是否具有自主性,地方政府财力事权关系理论上存在压力模式、匹配模式和自主模式三大类。地方政府财力事权关系的理论类型划分,旨在为进一步促进国家职能在地方落实,建立科学合理的地方政府行政管理体制提供理论依据。

1994 tax sharing reform is a critical institutional change in the process of the fiscal decentralization and marketization in China. Local governments therefore become the important micro -units of Chinese economic development and institutional innovation. Existing research have shown that, the success of Chinese - style fiscal federalism model lies on the integration of ＇ accountable to upper level＇ political system and fiscal decentralization.