国际碳减排利益格局:合作及其博弈机制分析

The Benefit Pattern in the International Carbon Emission Reduction:Cooperation and Game Mechanism

由于人类经济活动的大规模膨胀,温室气体的排放超出了地球生态系统对二氧化碳的自净能力的限度,从而引起地球温度上升,温度上升过快对人类社会经济的发展是一场大灾乱。本文通过非合作博弈分析可知,各国单独减排二氧化碳达不到预期的水平,因为各国存在对公共物品搭便车的动机;而京都议定书协议可以看作为一个合作博弈,这种合作博弈可以完成多于各国独自联盟时的减排量。根据京都议定书参与国缔约国的不同政治经济状况将该成员国分为四类:欧盟、美国、中国、其他国家,然后判断这四类成员博弈结果。用合作博弈的解的概念判断该合作目前不存在优超,但现行的博弈是不稳定的博弈。沃克机制是解决公共物品的一种有效机制,可以尝试沃克机制的分配方式来实现集体理性和个体理性的统一,达到联盟预定的碳减排目标,缓解全球气候变暖问题。

With the large-scale expansion of hanlan economic activities, greenhouse gas emissions are beyond the limits of self-purification capacity of planet＇s ecosystems to the carbon dioxide, and then the earth＇s temperature rises. If the temperature rises too fast, it will be a major disaster chaos for human socio-economic development. Non-cooperative game can＇t reach the expected level, because each country has the motive of free rider to public goods; ＂Kyoto Protocol＂ agreement as a cooperative game mechanism can complete the goal of reducing more carbon emissions. The members in the ＂Kyoto Protocol＂ are divided into four categories： the European Union, the United States, China, and other countries. According to their political and economic situations, the article then judge the game results of these members. The result shows that the current game solution is unstable. Walker mechanism is an effective mechanism to solve public goods. Walker mechanism can achieve both collective rationality and individual rationality of unity to finish the intended emission reduction targets.