摘要
论文的研究对象为一个地方纪检监察机构在过去20多年中的腐败治理策略,以其中的"清理"行动为切入点,尝试梳理清理行动的动态过程,并将其概念化为一种"运动式强制",总结其作为一种腐败治理行为的特点、功能和局限性。论文旨在回答长久以来困扰中国腐败研究领域中的一个问题,即为何国家目前在腐败治理中投入了相当大的精力和资源,而腐败的治理效应却一再碰到"瓶颈"。
This article focuses on the anti-corruption strategies in contemporary China.It attempts to answer a question that has been perplexing scholars studying political corruption for a long time:while the Party and the state have put so much energy into corruption control,why are the outcomes still unsatisfactory? We consider the 'clean-up' action in contemporary anti-corruption strategies as the key to answer this question.The clean-up action can be seen as a kind of campaign-style enforcement,rather than enforcement by law.Consequently,although the clean-up action has some effects in areas such as cadre control,self-purification and remedy,it can hardly fix the fundamental problems embedded in the re-distribution structure of contemporary China.
出处
《公共行政评论》
2010年第2期85-111,共27页
Journal of Public Administration
关键词
腐败治理策略
清理行动
运动式强制
Anti-corruption Strategy,Clean-up Actions,Campaign-style Enforcement