启蒙视域中的新教伦理主体观

The Subject Views of Protestant Ethics from the Perspective of Enlightenment

宗教改革的发生并非是人与信仰的决裂,它至多是人在世俗生活领域与宗教制度达成的和解。然而也正是这次和解,一个非同寻常的主体自治原则出现了。它一方面反对人的任何理性盲动,另一方面要求人独自承担面对上帝的救赎义务。这种新的信仰主体观使个人能够摆脱尘世和教条的束缚,获得世俗的自由,同时也让个人丧失了自主性。因此,从虔敬派运动到莱布尼茨的单子论,新教伦理的主体观一直得到不断修正,以期它能够符合启蒙运动对主体性的基本要求。

The occurrence of religious reform does not mean a discontinuance of man and his faith, but a compromise that man reaches between his real life and religious system. However, such a compromise brings about an extraordinary autonomy principle of subject. During the reform, any of man＇ s reasonable recklessness was denied, and at the same time he was required to burden the redemption of God independently. This new subject view made one get rid of the shackles of mortal life and doctrines and also lose their independenee. Therefore, from the Pietist movement to Leibniz＇ s Monadology, the subject views of Protestant Ethics have long been corrected to meet the requirements of subject raised by the Enlightenment Movement.