摘要
在多阶段委托代理关系中,代理人早期私有信息的存在和利用对于最优合同的设计有着重要的意义.本文考虑了多阶段委托代理模型中这样一类情况,代理人在合同刚刚签定之后和采取行动之前即获得早期私有信息,通过分析给出了这种情况下最优合同的条件,证明了代理人获取早期信息对委托代理双方的价值.
In principal agent relationship of multi period,the existence of agent's early information about the coming production and the use of them are very important to design of optimize contracts. This essay considers this kind of things in multi periods, which agent acquire private information just after signing contract and before acting,finds the condition of optimized contracts through analying and certificate the value of agent's acquiring of early information.
出处
《北京航空航天大学学报》
EI
CAS
CSCD
北大核心
1999年第1期88-90,共3页
Journal of Beijing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics
基金
国家自然科学基金
关键词
模型法
合同对策
委托-代理模型
早期私有信息
modeling
bargaining games
optimization
multi periods principal agent model
private information