企业联盟竞争下的两部定价与信息共享

Two-Part Tariff and Information Sharing under Enterprise Alliance Competition

利用博弈论的相关知识,研究了两个产销企业联盟之间竞争的两部定价与信息共享问题。每个企业联盟由一个生产企业和一个销售企业组成。根据是否实现联盟内信息共享,分三种情况分析了竞争的均衡问题,把信息共享价值的研究推广到企业联盟竞争层面。研究结果表明:当信息不对称时,生产企业会通过制定高于边际生产成本的批发价格,向销售企业支付信息租金,从而引导销售企业说真话。在企业联盟竞争的背景下,信息共享对该联盟具有正效应,然而对其竞争联盟的溢出效应却是负的。

Contracting and information sharing in two enterprise alliances,each consisting of one manufacturer and one retailer,are studied based on game theory.The equilibrium of the competition is investigated according to the status of information sharing in each enterprise alliance.Results show that under asymmetric information,the manufacturer will set the wholesale price above the marginal cost and pay information rent to the retailer for inducing truth telling.Under enterprise alliance competition,the direct effect of information sharing on an enterprise alliance is positive,and its spill-over effect on the competing enterprise alliance is negative.