不同竞合模式下企业研发投资决策及绩效——基于不确定条件的分析

The Enterprise's R&D Investment Decision and Performance under Different Co-competition Modes——Analysis based on R&D Uncertainty

考虑研发不确定条件,在研发阶段可合作,产出阶段产量竞争的两阶段动态博弈下,比较分析了不同竞合模式下,企业的研发决策及所能获得的研发绩效。结果表明,相对于研发竞争,只有溢出效应大时,研发卡特尔下企业才会降低研发门槛值,提高投资水平,同时,企业研发绩效得到增加,竞争研发联盟下企业一定会提高门槛值,降低投资水平,而其研发绩效是不确定的。卡特尔研发联盟优于其他模式,企业研发门槛值最低,投资水平最高,同时可获得最高研发绩效。此外,研发竞争下,溢出增加时企业一定会提升门槛值,降低投资水平,研发绩效可能会增加;研发卡特尔下,溢出增加企业一定会降低研发门槛值,提升投资水平,研发绩效增加。

Taking into account the RD uncertainty,under the two stage game of RD stage could cooperate but output stage still quality compete,the enterprise＇s investment action and the RD performance under different RD co-competition modes were compared.Results shown,relative to RD competition,only in great spillover effect,higher RD investment and lower RD threshold obtained under RD cartelization,and under RJV competition,the RD investment was lower and the threshold was higher,and the performance was uncertain. RJV cartelization predominate the other modes,could obtain the highest investment level,lowest RD threshold,and also the highest RD performance.Under the RD competition,the increase of spillover would upgrade the threshold certainly,maybe accelerate the RD performance,under cartelization,the increase of spillover would raise investment level,reduce the threshold and also increase the RD performance certainly.