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考虑努力因素的供应链收益共享演化契约 被引量:36

Supply Chain Revenue-Sharing Evolvement-Contract with Sales Effort Effects
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摘要 在需求随机、努力水平影响需求的供应链环境里,在传统供应链收益共享契约基础上构建了一种演化契约。并在委托代理框架下,对该演化契约进行了研究。首先分析了销售商的努力因素对收益共享契约的影响,得出了销售商努力水平反应函数及最优投入值;其次,研究得出了供应商在收益共享契约中,向销售商所提供的最优收益共享比例,以及最优的分担销售商的努力成本比例;再次,论证了本文所研究的收益共享演化契约可以实现供应链协调;最后,通过算例分析验证本文研究结论的有效性。 In a single-period two-stage supply chain facing stochastic effort dependent demand,we construct a evolvement-contract,and research on it by principal-agent theory.Firstly,the paper analyzes retailer's effort level's impact on supply chain revenue-sharing evolvementcontract,and gain retailer's effort level's reaction function and its optimal value;secondly,the paper gets the optimal revenue-sharing coefficient and cost-sharing one,which the supplier give to the retailer;Then,study in the paper indicates that the supply chain revenue-sharing evolvement-contract can realize supply chain collaboration;Finally,we validate and illuminate the research conclusion by numerical analyzing.
出处 《管理工程学报》 CSSCI 北大核心 2010年第2期135-138,134,共5页 Journal of Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management
基金 教育部人文社科青年基金(09YJC630020) 中国博士后科学基金面上项目(20090461323)
关键词 收益共享契约 努力因素 演化契约 委托代理 供应链协调 revenue-sharing contract sales effort evolvement-contract principal-agent supply chain coordination
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参考文献14

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二级参考文献24

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同被引文献339

引证文献36

二级引证文献187

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