基于政府补贴行为的科技保险参与主体博弈分析及对策研究

Technology insurance participants based on government′s subsidizing behaviors——A game analysis and related countermeasures

科技保险是我国政府落实科教兴国战略、推动自主创新的重要举措。从试点情况来看,仅靠保险公司推广科技保险还存在许多困难。本文通过分析科技保险的特殊属性及其存在的市场失灵问题,认为国家有必要对其进行财政补贴和政策支持;同时,建立博弈模型对科技保险参与主体的行为分析,发现面对复杂多变的科技风险必须由政府实施补贴才能实现纳什均衡。基于此,本文设计了政府参与下科技保险的风险防范及转移模型,并对政府如何有效实施财政补贴提出具体策略。

Technology insurance is an important measure for Chinese government to implement the national strategy of rejuvenating the country through science and education, and promoting independent innovation. The results of the pilot programs have shown, however, there are many difficulties for the insurance company to publicize technology insurance on their own. By analyzing the special nature of technology insurance and existing market failure phe- nomena, the paper held that government＇s financial subsidy and policy support was indispensable for the operation of technology insurance. By establishing the game model to analyze participants＇ behaviors towards technology in- surance, the results revealed that the Nash equilibrium could only be achieved through government＇s financial subsidy in the face of complex technological risks. Based on these analyses, the paper designed the model of risk prevention and transfer related to technology insurance with government participation, and put forward specific suggestions on government＇s effective implementation of financial subsidy.