政治关联、职位壕沟与高管变更——来自中国财务困境上市公司的经验证据

Political Connection,Position Entrenchment and Management Turnover-Evidence from Distressed Listed Firms in China

本文以高管变更为研究切入点,从公司治理效率的角度对政治关联的经济后果作了崭新的诠释。通过对1998～2008年我国388家被特别处理公司中842位高层管理人员变更情况进行实证检验,研究发现高管的政治关联越密切,因业绩低劣而被迫离职的可能性越小。换言之,高管所拥有的政治资源成为其构筑职位壕沟的资本,弱化了公司治理对高管应有的监管和约束机制。进一步的研究还发现,董事长和总经理同时离职的公司未来业绩表现要明显好于两职都不变更的公司;而在两职都留任的公司,如果高管与政府关系越紧密,公司未来业绩提升的幅度越小甚至可能继续恶化。上述结果再次说明了高管所拥有的政治关联对公司而言,非但不是一种可资利用的资源,反而加强管理者的壕沟效应,并加剧政府对公司的干预行为,从而遏制了公司治理效率的提高。

Using the event of management turnover as the starting point for research, this paper examines the re- lationship between political connection and the efficiency of corporate governance. Based on the sample of 388 special treatment companies that involve with 842 senior manages, the empirical evidences show that political connection significantly decreases the association between management turnover and poor performance. Further evidences indicate that the future performance of the companies where both the chairman and the CEO are forced to leave is better than others. And in the companies which ＂the chairnlan and the CEO remain in office, the greater the extent of political connection is, the less the future performance of the companies improves. These results demonstrate that the political resource of the senior management becomes the capital to enhance their post trench effect and intensifies the intervention behavior of the government, which weakens the effectiveness of the governance mechanism of corporations.