银行道德风险、利益侵占与信贷资金配置效率——基于中国上市公司的经验证据

Moral Hazard of Banks,Benefit Expropriation and the Allocation Efficiency of Credit Capital:Evidence from Listed Companies in China

本文以集团控股公司信贷融资为研究视角,实证性研究了银行道德风险导致信贷资金低效配置的一种典型作用路径。研究发现,由于银行存在短期内扩张信贷规模的道德风险,易与存在过度信贷融资需求的上市公司大股东形成合谋,导致利益侵占风险越高的公司获得过度的银行信贷资金支持。银行与大股东的双重道德风险导致了信贷资金配置的低效率。本文建议应从坚持商业银行市场化改革和打破国有银行软预算约束机制入手解决银行体系道德风险问题,提高信贷资金配置效率。

Based on the analysis on credit financing of listed group-holding companies, the paper empirically studies a typical channel through which moral hazard of banks restricts the allocation efficiency of credit capital. The results find that as the existence of moral hazard of bank credit expansion in short term, banks are inclined to collude with majority shareholders who have excessive demand of credit capital, and the collusion results in that companies having higher risk of being expropriated get excessive support by commercial banks. The dual moral hazard of banks and majority shareholders causes the allocation inefficiency of credit capital. The author suggests that the settlement of banks＇ moral hazard lies on continuing market-oriented bank reform and breaking the soft budget mechanism of state-owned banks.