社会资本、法律保护与IPO盈余管理

Social Capital,Law Protection and IPO Earnings Management

本文引入"社会资本"这一社会学概念,首次从微观视角实证研究我国各省社会资本水平差异对上市公司IPO盈余管理行为的影响,并进而深入探讨社会资本与法律保护这两种外部约束机制在影响公司盈余管理决策方面的相互替代作用。结果发现:在社会资本水平较高的省份,上市公司更不可能进行IPO盈余管理,而且社会资本与法律保护在公司IPO盈余管理决策中所起的作用是可替代的,即在我国法律保护比较薄弱的地区,社会资本对IPO盈余管理行为的约束作用更加显著;反之反是。本文的研究不仅拓展了盈余管理的研究领域,而且丰富了社会资本与法律保护替代作用的研究。

This paper introduces this sociological notion 'social capital',firstly empirically studies the influence of the different levels of social capital of Chinese provinces on IPO earnings management of Listed companies,and further deeply explores the mutual substituting role of social capital and law protection these two exterior restricting mechanisms in IPO earnings management decisions.We find that in provinces with higher levels of social capital,the listed companies are less likely to manage the IPO earnings,moreover,the role of social capital and law protection is substituting in companies' IPO earnings management decisions,in other words,in the region in which the level of law protection is relatively weaker,social capital tends to have a stronger influence on IPO earnings management,and vice versa.Our study has not only extended the research of earning management,but also enriches the studies in the substituting role of social capital and law protection.