公司治理对盈余管理程度的制约作用--以所有权性质为背景的经验分析

The Restrictive Role of Corporate Governance on Earnings Management:An Empirical Study Based on Ownership Property

本文使用2003～2005年来自我国证券市场的数据,利用调整的截面Jones现金流模型计量操控性应计利润,以所有权性质为背景,分别民营和国有上市公司样本对公司治理结构与盈余管理程度之间的关系进行了实证检验和比较分析。我们发现,两类公司的治理结构对其盈余管理程度的制约机制存在重大差别。具体而言,民营上市公司董事会独立性和监事会勤勉性与其盈余管理程度存在正向线性关系,而股权集中度和制衡度与盈余管理程度则存在倒U形的非线性关系。与此不同的是,国有上市公司的董事会、监事会及股权结构对盈余管理程度的制约作用均不显著。而表征机构投资者的哑变量却与国有上市公司的盈余管理程度存在正向的线性关系。

Using adjusted cross-sectional Jones cash flow model and data from Chinese securities market during 2003-2005, this paper empirically studies the relationship between corporate governance and earnings management based on the ownership property. We find that, the restrictive role of corporate governance on earnings management is quite different between SOEs and private firms. Specifically, the independence of director board and the diligence of supervisory board are both positively related to the earnings management, and there exists a nonlinear inverted U-shape relationship between ownership concentration or ownership balance and earnings management in private firms. On the contrary, there has no significant relationship between the director board or supervisory board or ownership structure and earnings management in SOEs, while the dummy variable characterizing institutional investors is positively related to the earnings management.