摘要
在分析建筑工程监理单位和承包商的相互关系的基础上,建立进化博弈模型并对监理单位和承包商的博弈行为进行了分析,发现在工程项目建设过程中,监理单位对承包商监管没有积极性,承包商履约和违约两种行为策略交替出现,致使博弈在一定条件下没有进化稳定策略点。针对上述情况,本文提出一些提高工程项目可实施性和整体绩效的建议。
Based on the analysis of the relationship between the supervising company and contractor,an evolutionary game model is established,which is to analyze the behaviors game between them.It discovers that there is no positivity to supervise and control the contractor for the supervising company in the construction project's program,and the emergence of execution and inexecution of the contractor is alternate.So there is no steady evolutionary strategy point in the game.In view of this kind of situation,this paper proposes some manageable advices which is to improve the feasibility and the whole performance of the construction project.
出处
《吉林工程技术师范学院学报》
2010年第1期65-67,共3页
Journal of Jilin Engineering Normal University
关键词
建筑工程
建设主体
行为
博弈分析
construction project
construction bodies
behavior
game analysis