寡头垄断、非线性定价与市场分割

Duopoly,Nonlinear Pricing and Market Segmentation

在非对称双寡头垄断、消费者的阿罗—普拉特风险规避度为常数的假设条件下,分析非对称双寡头企业的非线性定价行为与市场均衡。认为:当双寡头企业都基于各自的边际成本实现最优非线性定价时,两企业的价格套餐会发生交叉,进而产生市场分割,需求量大的消费者会选择低成本企业的价格套餐,而低需求量的消费者偏好则相反。而双寡头企业进行价格博弈并形成竞争时,两企业的竞争性均衡价格同样会发生交叉,进而也会产生市场分割。主要结论将为寡头垄断行业的价格规制提供一些理论启示。

The author analyzes the nonlinear pricing behaviors and the market equilibrium of asymmetric duopoly enterprises under the assumption that the asymmetric duopoly and the Arrow - Pratt＇ s risk aversion of customers are constants. He believes that when the optimal nonlinear pricing of the duopoly enterprises is achieved based on their marginal costs, their pricing packages are crossed which leads to market segmentation. High level consumers will choose the pricing package of low cost enterprise, with the low level consumers in the contrary. When duopoly enterprises make price game and result in competition, the competitive equilibrium price will be crossed, which further leads to market segmentation as well. The conclusion of the paper will give some theoretical enlightenment to the price regulation of duopoly industry.