摘要
股权分置改革已经成为我国证券市场发展中的一个里程碑。但全流通环境下的上市公司管理层股权激励机制,能否真正解决公司制企业产权结构的多元化导致的代理问题,其效应如何,值得研究。以上市公司2008年的截面数据为样本,在检验股权激励内生性的基础上,通过寻找相似控制变量的倾向评分匹配方控制内生性,分析上市公司管理层股权激励对企业绩效和风险的影响效应。结论得出,股权激励的实施可以提高公司的绩效,降低系统风险,但不是对各家公司都适用,上市公司要注意选择适合自身发展的激励方式和方案。
Reform of non-tradable shares has been a milestone in China's securities market. Can equity incentives on the management solve the agency problems caused by the company ownership structure? How is the effect of the implementation? These problems are worth studying. This paper takes cross-sectional data of listed companies in 2008 as a sample. Based on the equity incentive endogeneity inspection, we control endogeneity through Propensity Score Matching and then analyze equity incentive on the management of listed companies for enterprise performance and risks. We eonclud that equity incentive can improve the company's performance and reduce the company's systematic risk. Meanwhile, equity incentive is not right for every company, so listed companies should choose the incentive plans and programs which are fit for their development.
出处
《湖南工程学院学报(社会科学版)》
2010年第2期13-17,共5页
Journal of Hunan Institute of Engineering(Social Science Edition)
关键词
股权激励
内生性
绩效
风险
equity incentive
endogeneity
performance
risk