现金持有、产权结构与现金价值

CASH HOLDINGS, OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE, AND THE VALUE OF CASH HOLDINGS

现金持有会降低现金的边际价值，弱法律环境下的股权集中可以改善现金的边际价值。基于产权和委托代理理论，本文就现金持有量、股权结构对现金价值的影响进行了理论分析，并以我国上市公司1999年至2005年的数据为样本，分别检验了非流通股股权集中度和流通股股权集中度对现金的边际价值的影响，及不同产权性质下，企业现金持有的现金边际价值差异。发现，过多持有现金会导致企业内部现金的边际价值减少，同时，集中的股权结构可以改善现金的边际价值：产权性质方面，同等条件下，相比其他类型的企业，地方政府所属企业的现金边际价值最低：在改善现金的边际价值方面，对于中央所属企业，非流通股治理效果明显，而民营经济，则流通股治理效果显著。

Based on the property right theory of firms, and in view of the special institutional settings in China, this paper analyses the interactive effects of cash holdings and ownership structure on cash value. Using the data on Chinese listed companies between 1999 and 2005, we investigate the governance effect of various shareholders when not all the shares of listed corporations are tradable. The results show that excess cash holdings lead to a decrease in cash value; ownership concentration mitigates the agency cost of cash, and thus improves cash value; the marginal value of cash is lowest for local government-owned firms when compared with other firms; the concentration of ownership in nontradable shares has an effect on the marginal value of cash for central government-owned firms, while the concentration of ownership in tradable shares can improve the marginal value of cash for private firms.