上市公司在操纵经营性现金流吗？——基于季度报告的实证分析

ARE CASH FLOWS MANAGED？mEMPIRICAL EVIDENCE FROM QUARTERLY FINANCIAL STATEMENTS OF CHINESE LISTED FIRMS

在财务操纵方面，目前尽管存在大量的盈余管理研究，但鲜有文献涉及现金流最的操纵问题。本文利用中国A股上市公司2003年至2004年的季度财务数据对后一问题进行了实证检验。我们的研究发现，第三季度末经营活动现金流量净额低于净利润的公司，在第四季度存在调增现金流量的行为。我国的融资监管政策对现金流量的操纵行为也产生了潜在影响，这主要表现在当公司截止第三季度经营活动所产生的现金流量净额为负时，希望进行再融资的公司为了避免传递关于公司财务风险的不利信号，同样有动机在第四季度显著调增经营性现金流量水平。

Many studies have investigated earnings management, but few can be found on cash flow management. We take quarterly accounting data of Chinese A-share stocks as our sample to study cash flow management. We find that when companies＇ cash flows from operations （CFOs） are less than earnings by the end of the third quarter, their managers will manipu- late CFOs upwards in the fourth quarter to make the annual CFOs match annual earnings. The government＇s policy on seasoned equity offerings （SEOs） is another potential factor leading to CFO-manipulation behaviour. Negative CFOs are usually regarded as a signal of higher financial risks. When CFOs are negative by the end of the third quarter, the potential for SEOs, especially those threshold applicants （with an ROE slightly over 6 per cent）, tend to manipulate earnings upwards in the fourth quarter.