商业银行信贷决策与内部信用评级：一个授权激励视角的研究被引量：9

Loan Decisions and Internal Credit Rating of Commercial Banks:A Study Based on Delegation as an Incentive

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摘要在我国商业银行的信贷决策中,普遍存在着"信息困境":信贷决策所依赖的信息有着"硬信息软化"的特征、信贷决策流程中普遍存在着信息的"私有化"、为信贷决策所收集信息的使用效率不足。怎么克服上述"信息困境"以提高信贷决策的质量和效率,是银行面临的现实问题。本文指出,一个高质量的内部信用评级机制能够成为向信贷业务人员转移信贷决策权的中介,进而激励信贷业务人员做好信息工作。本文提供了一个分析框架以指导信贷决策者审慎地根据内部信用评级的质量来给予信贷业务人员适当的决策权重,在规避过度授权引致的风险的同时,最大限度地发挥授权的激励作用。在这个过程中,"信息困境"被有效克服,信贷决策权配置得到优化。本文对银行的信贷决策实践和内部信用评级机制的建设有着一定的指导作用。 In the loan decision of commercial banks in China, there is widespread ＂information dilemma＂. How to overcome the dilemma in order to improve the quality and the efficiency of loan decision is a practical problem faced by commercial banks. The paper provides an analytical framework to guide loan decision-makers to cautiously give the proper decision weights to the credit officers according to the quality of internal credit rating,in the circumvention of the risks of excessive authority, while maximizing the incentives authorized. In this process, the dilemma could be effectively got over while the allocation of credit decision-making power can be optimized. This paper has a certain guiding function for the practice of loan decision and the internal credit rating mechanism.

作者施丽芳廖飞丁德明茅宁

机构地区南京大学管理学院国家审计署驻南京特派员办事处

出处《金融研究》 CSSCI 北大核心 2010年第1期117-130,共14页 Journal of Financial Research

基金国家自然科学基金项目:管理干预与企业内部决策权有效配置--基于行为决策视角的研究(70972033)阶段性研究成果国家自然科学基金项目:可信性、公平感与企业内部授权机制的有效性--基于行为合约视角的研究(70772031)资助

关键词信贷决策内部信用评级授权激励不确定性 loan decisions, internal credit rating, delegation as an incentive, uncertainty

分类号 F832.4 [经济管理—金融学]

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