中国上市公司CEO薪酬存在激励后效吗？

Is CEO Compensation Incentive Relative to Performance Valid in Chinese Listed Companies

与以往纯粹基于代理理论研究CEO薪酬激励问题不同,本文同时考虑乘员理论和制度理论等,从多视角研究上市公司治理绩效。我们采用2005～2008年沪深上市公司面板数据,按全样本、私人与国有控股、国有控股与集体等对照组进行混合回归(Pooled Regress)分析,研究证实中国上市公司CEO薪酬激励与公司业绩显著正相关,董事会部分特征与薪酬机制设计相关;被激励后的CEO在外部治理环境监控下会进一步改善公司业绩,产生激励后效,股权集中度有正向促进作用,但董事会特征与激励后效无关。研究揭示目前董事会受制于代理问题,致力于改善CEO薪酬激励不足,公司业绩改善主要来自于政策、制度变革等外部公司治理,尤其国有控股公司制度改革效应和乘员主义突出,但董事会内部绩效治理仍较弱;这对改善中国CEO薪酬机制设计及内部治理具有积极意义。论文进一步采用固定效应回归(Fixed-effectRegress)、两阶段最小二乘回归法(Two Stage Least Squares Regress)和薪酬灵敏度分析后依然支持该结论。

Most papers studied the relationship between CEO compensation and firm performance on endogenoug perspective only basing on the Principle-Agent Theory, while this paper analyzes CEO compensation incentives related to firm performance concerning on Stewardship Theory and Institute Theory from exogenous perspectives as well. The findings are （ 1 ） CEO compensation is positive related to finn performance significantly under the control of board of directors, and the rewarded CEO will work hard to enhance firm performance significantly, which causes Post-Incentive Effects（ PIE）, but （2） firm performance is not significant related to the characteristics of Board of directors, namely, the improvement Of firm performance is caused by outside environment instead of the control of Boards, which support Agency Theory and institute Theory, （3）Only the convergence of ownership positively supports Post-Incentive Effects and negatively related to CEO compensation, so it encourages Stewardship Theory. The analysis is based on the panel data of Chinese listed companies over four-year period from 2005 to 2008, and the result is still robust when comparing Pooled-regress to Fixed-effect regress for three groups of different State-owned companies comparing with Private-owned companies, Collective-owned companies and all samples. Finally, the 2SLS regress and the sensitive analysis of CEO compensation show that CEO compensation related to performance is reaching availability.