专用性人力资本投资与工资合约--引入不对称信息的敲竹杠模型

Specific Human Capital Investment and Wage Contracts:A Hold-up Model with Asymmetric Information

经典的不完全合约理论认为,当事人的专用性投资会引发敲竹杠行为从而导致专用性投资的无效率。本文通过在经典的敲竹杠模型中引入关于雇员能力的不对称信息,构建一个新的模型来分析企业工资合约的刚性与灵活性,以解决敲竹杠所导致的专用性人力资本投资不足。分析表明:从保护雇佣双方专用性人力资本投资方面看,固定工资合约优于灵活工资合约;且在固定工资合约下,雇员虽然仍可能面临敲竹杠风险,但敲竹杠未必妨碍专用性人力资本投资效率。

The classical theory of incomplete contracts argues that specific investment will bring on hold -up problem, further leading to inefficiencies of specific investment. By introducing asymmetric information about employee ＇ s ability into the classical hold - up model, this paper constructs an innovative model to analyze the rigidity and flexibility of wage contracts, in order to solve the deficiency problems of specific human capital investment induced by hold - up. We find that in the view of protecting specific human capital investment, fixed wage contracts are superior to flexible wage contracts; under the fixed wage contracts, employees maybe still face hold -up risk,but hold- up may not necessarily impede efficient specific human capital investment.