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健康险市场道德风险的检验 被引量:9

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摘要 信息不对称引起的逆向选择和道德风险往往会影响市场的运行效率,导致"市场失灵"。区分逆向选择和道德风险,可以更有针对性地进行政策设计,提升市场运行效率。但是由于逆向选择和道德风险的后果是市场上都呈现出相似的高风险者高保险的现象,因此传统的实证上很难将两者区分开来。本文通过考察重大疾病保险和非重大疾病保险中投保人保险程度和投保人风险类别的关系之间的差异,尝试以此为基础分离出道德风险的影响,并借此研究国内健康险市场是否存在较为严重的道德风险现象。通过分析,论文发现国内健康险市场的确存在道德风险,但是,相比其他类型的健康保险,重大疾病保险的道德风险要小一些。
出处 《管理世界》 CSSCI 北大核心 2010年第6期50-55,共6页 Journal of Management World
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参考文献15

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同被引文献135

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  • 2陈辉金,韩元杰.数据挖掘和信息融合在保险业欺诈识别中的应用[J].计算机与现代化,2005(9):110-112. 被引量:5
  • 3张欢.中国社会保险逆向选择问题的理论分析与实证研究[J].管理世界,2006,22(2):41-49. 被引量:51
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