期刊文献+

政府掠夺、内部人合谋与公司治理——兼论中小投资者保护 被引量:3

Predatory Government Insider Collusion and Corporate Governance——In View of Minority Investor Protection
下载PDF
导出
摘要 通过建立一个综合考虑法律、股权结构、大股东监督、经理人激励和证券监管、政府掠夺在内的分析大股东和经理人合谋侵权的委托—代理模型,运用标准逆向归纳法分析不同法律环境保护下利益相关者之间的利益关系。结果显示,法律对中小投资者保护至关重要;在中等或弱法律保护下,应提高证券监管和执法效率;在强法律保护下,证券监管效率对公司价值没有影响,政府管制应该逐渐淡出证券市场。不管法律保护水平如何,都应该坚持改善政府治理水平,提高政府运行效率,减少对企业的掠夺,从而达到提高公司价值和保护中小投资者权益的目的。 Taking law ownership structure monitoring of large shareholders incentive of chief executive officials regulation of securities and predatory government into consideration this paper has developed a comprehensive principal-agent model for analyzing how large shareholder expropriate minority investors in collusion with managers and uses the standard backward induction to analyze beneficial relations among stakeholders under different levels of legal protection.The equilibrium result shows that law is of vital importance to protect middle or small investors under the condition of moderate or bad legal protection we should enhance efficiency of securities regulation and law enforcement under the condition of good legal protection corporate value is not affected by securities regulation so government regulation should withdrawal from security market.Regardless of the level of legal protection we should insist on improving government governance enhancing the efficiency of government operations decreasing expropriation of companies in order to bring about higher corporate value and better protection of middle or small investors.
出处 《广东金融学院学报》 CSSCI 北大核心 2010年第3期3-19,共17页 Journal of Guangdong University of Finance
关键词 公司治理 政府掠夺 内部人合谋 证券监管 中小投资者保护 corporate governance predatory government insider collusion securities regulation protection of middle or small investors
  • 相关文献

参考文献27

  • 1North Douglass C. , 1990. Institulional Change and Economic Performance,Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, U. K.
  • 2Djankov, S., Glaeser, E., La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., and Shleifer, A., 2003. The New Comparative Economics, Journal of Comparative Economics, Vol. 31, No. 4 : 595-619.
  • 3Stulz, R. M., 2005. The Limits of Financial Globalization,Journal of Finance, Vol. 60,No. 4: 1595-1638.
  • 4Stulz, R., 2006. Financial Globalization, Corporate Governance, and Eastern Europc,SSRN Working Paper, Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract = 871217.
  • 5王一江.国家与经济:关于转型中的中国市场经济改革[M].北京:北京大学出版社,2007.
  • 6Shleifer, A., Vishny, R. , 1997. A Survey of Corporate Governance,Journal of Finance,Vol. 52, No. 2:737-783.
  • 7Johnson, S., Boone, P., Breach ,A., Friedman, E., 2000. Corporate Governance in the Asian Financial Crisis,Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 58, No.1: 141-186.
  • 8Claessens, S., Djankov, S., Fan, J., Lang, IJ., 2002. Disentangling the Ineentive and Entrenchment Effects of Large Shareholdings,Journal of Finance, Vol. 57, No. 6: 2379-2408.
  • 9陈晓,王琨.关联交易、公司治理与国有股改革——来自我国资本市场的实证证据[J].经济研究,2005,40(4):77-86. 被引量:345
  • 10La Porta, R. , Lopez-de-Silanes, F. , Shleifer, A. , and Vishny, RW. , 2002. Investor Protection and Corporate Valuation,Journal of Finance, Vol. 57, No. 3:1147-1170.

二级参考文献60

共引文献1709

同被引文献25

引证文献3

二级引证文献14

相关作者

内容加载中请稍等...

相关机构

内容加载中请稍等...

相关主题

内容加载中请稍等...

浏览历史

内容加载中请稍等...
;
使用帮助 返回顶部