摘要
本文剖析了次贷危机中的"逆向选择、道德风险与动态不一致性"的产生机制,分析了新资本协议改革的主要进展,试图为监管当局克服信息不对称,进行更恰当的机制设计提供监管建议;分析中国银行业应对更为严格的资本监管环境,如何从消除信息不对称角度提高风险管理水平。
In this thesis, we analyze the mechanics of "adverse selection, moral hazard and time-inconsistence" in sub-prime crisis and the current development of Basel Ⅱ in order to give some advice to China's financial supervisors on how to overcome asymmetric information. We also aim to provide some advice on risk management to the bank sector in case of a more rigorous capital supervision environment in the near future.
出处
《国际金融研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2010年第6期70-78,共9页
Studies of International Finance