摘要
"公司+农户"这一组织模式在其运行过程中面临着越来越多的问题与困境,高违约率的现实使得分析公司和农户间契约的内在机制、设计更加有效的契约形式显得尤为迫切。在我国法律尚不能完全强制契约执行的前提下,合理的风险分担机制应该是解决农业契约违约率过高、提高农业契约运作效率的基本方向。基于重复博弈理论,公司和农户签订长期契约并且将风险贴水作为一种自我履约机制,将有助于抑制公司的违约倾向,保证契约的稳定运作。
The model of ＂Processors ＋ Growers＂ has been facing an increasing number of problems and difficulties during its operation.The instability and the high default rate of these contracts have prompted us to analyze the inner mechanisms and design more effective forms of contracts.As Chinas law enforcement contract is still not fully implemented,the reasonable risk-sharing mechanism should be the basic direction to solve the high default rates of these contracts and improve the operational efficiency.On repeated game theory,the paper shows that a reasonable risk premium which the processors promised to give growers will help to curb the processors＇ default tendency and ensure stability.
出处
《财贸研究》
CSSCI
2010年第3期27-32,共6页
Finance and Trade Research
基金
国家自然科学基金项目"基于‘公司+农户’模式的食用农产品供应链契约设计研究"(70901034)
教育部人文社会科学规划项目"农产品供应链质量安全监管研究--基于供应链成员间行为博弈的角度"(09YJA630050)的阶段性成果
关键词
农业契约
重复博弈
自我履约机制
风险贴水
agricultural contract
repeated game theory
self-enforcing mechanism
risk premium
