摘要
本文认为,地方政府的规制水平不同,使得不同地区私营企业家的非生产性努力程度有差异;在企业家能够自由流动的条件下,规制条件好的地区会对企业家产生集聚效应,促使地区私营经济快速发展;私营企业家的集聚使私营经济的力量得到壮大,更能影响政府的政策和规制条件,因此经济朝着优均衡的状态发展;如果地区私营经济向地方政府寻租,造成偏私性资源配置,那么私营经济发展就会走向劣均衡。
This paper assumes that the enterprisers can decide their favorite region to invest and move freely. The enterpriser's effort can be divided into productive effort and unproductive effort. Private entrepreneurs have to pay non-productive efforts into grasping the government regulation to fight for their own development space when the local government regulation is imperfect. If the local government set policy barriers to add the extent of non-productive effort of entrepreneurs for increasing its earnings ,the regional private economy will fall into a low-level trap. If the local government wants to obtain long-term economic development ,it will improve its regulation quality and this region will have higher productivity. In the other hand,the better regu- lation quality will attract more private entrepreneurs to venture in this region,which makes the regional private sector development has entered a virtuous cycle. This is the dual-path dependence of institutional change mechanism.
出处
《南方经济》
CSSCI
北大核心
2010年第6期27-38,74,共13页
South China Journal of Economics
基金
广东省"十五"规划特别委托项目"广东发展非公有制经济的体制保障"(批准号:03/04T03)
广东省教育厅重点项目"民营企业制度创新与成长"(04JDXM79007)的资助
中山大学二期"985工程"产业经济与区域发展研究哲学社会科学创新基地专项基金项目的研究成果之一
关键词
地方政府规制
非生产性努力
双重路径依赖
Local Government Regulation
Non-productive Efforts
Dual-Path Dependence