中介机构、寻租网络与交易型腐败:中国省份面板数据的实证研究

Intermediary,Rent-seeking Network,and Corruption Deal:Empirical Research Based on Provincial Panel Data of China

中介机构参与腐败交易已成为全球范围内腐败交易的一种新趋势,在中国表现得非常突出。本文结合转轨经济的特殊性,借鉴新经济社会学中的嵌入性理论,构建博弈模型,从中介机构与政府官员之间经由社会关系纽带维系的寻租网络入手,揭示中介机构参与腐败交易的原因,并以中国省份的面板数据进行实证检验。研究结果表明,当经济中存在与政府官员具有特殊社会关系的寻租型中介机构时,腐败水平会上升,而且中介机构和官员间的社会关系纽带强度越高,腐败水平上升得越显著。提高腐败治理效果,不能单纯依靠监督和惩罚官员,还必须在中介服务业中建立政府官员回避制度,加大对中介机构参与腐败交易的惩罚,推行电子政务,提高政府规制的透明性。

It has become a new trend for the intermediary to take part in corruption deals, which is especially conspicuous in China. Basing on the embeddedness theory of new economic sociology, and taking into account the special nature of economy during the transition period, this paper builds a game model, and starts with the rent-seeking network maintained by ties of social relations between intermediaries and government officials to reveal reasons for intermediaries involving in corruption deals. In addition, the paper makes an empirical test by using a panel data at the provincial level. The results show that if there is a rent-seeking intermediary who has special social relations with government officials, corruption levels would raise. Besides, the closer the social relations between the intermediary and officials, the more significant the corruption increases. Thus, to enhance the efforts of corruption control, we cannot simply rely on the supervision and punishment of officials, and it is also necessary to establish the administrative avoiding system in the intermediary services industry, increase penalties for the intermediary participating in corruption deals, promote e-government, and improve the transparency of government regulation.