巨灾保险供给主体的演化博弈分析

The analysis on the evolution of catastrophe insurance providers

巨灾保险由谁承担是建立巨灾风险管理体系的首要问题。政府与保险公司是巨灾保险的两个主要供应来源,两方不同形式的组成会导致巨灾保险制度运行效果上的差异。针对当前相关博弈研究中静态决策、理性决策等局限,本文通过构建政府与保险公司的演化博弈模型,分析在不同情况下局中人对策略的动态抉择。模型的分析结果表明:增加合作利润,减少合作的初始成本以及合作方遭受的损失等措施,都能促进政府和保险公司的有效合作。

The major question in establishing the catastrophe management system is who will be responsible for the disaster. Government and insures are two main suppliers for catastrophe insurance. Their different cooperation patterns will lead to different effects of the catastrophe management system. In view of the limitations of relevant resear- ches such as static decision-making and rational decision-making methods, this article analyzed the dynamic choice of players in different situations through establishing the evolution game model. Based on the model, the analysis resuits showed that increasing the cooperative profits, or reducing the initial costs of cooperation and the losses of partners would contribute to the effective cooperation of government and insures.