可转换债券对并购双边道德风险防范的实验研究

Experimental Investigation on Influence of Convertible Bonds on Resoultion of Double Moral Hazard in Mergers and Acquisitions

以往对可转换债券与双边道德风险防范的研究仅限于风险资本投资过程中,较少有研究对其在并购中作为支付契约所发挥的作用进行分析。通过借鉴经济学实验室方法,研究在私有利益存在的情况下,可转换债券支付契约对于防范并购中双边道德风险所发挥的作用。实验设计依据双边道德风险模型中公认的参数表示方法,用并购双方所投入的努力水平测度道德风险,以现金支付契约、股票支付契约和现金加股票的混合支付契约作为控制组,以可转换债券支付契约作为观察组。研究结果表明,可转换债券和股票对目标方的激励效果显著优于现金,可转换债券对并购方的激励效果显著优于其他契约,可转换债券契约的并购协同效应显著高于其他契约,且随着并购方投入水平的增加,目标方执行转换期权的可能性越大。

Privious researches on convertible bonds and the prevention of double moral hazard mainly focuse on venture capital investment,few attention has been paid to its function as payment contract in mergers and acquisitions（MAs）.By introducing an experimental appraoch,this paper studies how convertible bonds payment contract prevents double moral hazard in MAs under the consideration of private benefits.On the basis of a well-accepted parametric representated method in double moral hazard model,the effort levels of partners in MAs were used to measure double moral hazard in this experiment design.Furthermore,cash,stock,a mixed of cash and stock contracts were regarded as control groups,and convertible bonds contract was regarded as observation groups.The results demonstrate that,firstly the incentive effects in convertible bonds and stock on targets are significantly better than that in cash,secondly the incentive effect of convertible bonds on acquirers is better than that in cash and stock,thirdly the synertic value of convertible bonds is obviously higher than others,and the higher the effort levels of acquirers,the stronger the conversion option probablitily of targets.