当代中国地方政府行为的激励结构解析

Analysis on the Incentive Structure of Act of Local Government in Present China

从目前的研究现状考察,人们分析当代中国地方政府行为的激励结构时主要的理论资源是政治锦标赛理论、委托代理理论和公共选择理论。政治锦标赛理论是从地方政府官员面临的激励角度研究地方政府行为;委托代理理论是从委托代理关系的角度研究地方政府行为;公共选择理论是运用经济学理论解释地方政府行为。这三种理论资源提供的解析既相互区别又互为补充,为我们观察和分析当代中国地方政府的激励结构提供了比较完整的分析框架。同时,三种不同理论视角的分析也为人们带来了很多有价值的启示。

Investigating from current research, the main theoretical resources while analyzing the incentive structure of act of local government in present china are political Championship theory, the principal-agent theory and the theory of public choice. From the angle of the incentive facing by local government officials, political Championship theory studied the act of local government. From the angle of principal-agent relationship, the principal-agent theory studied the act of local government. The theory of public choice explained the act of local government applying economic theories. The explain provided by these three theoretical resources not only differentiated but complemented each other and provided a comprehensive analysis framework for observing and analyzing the incentive structure of act of local government in present China. At the same time, three different theoretical perspectives also brought a lot of valuable inspiration.