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基于政府与企业合作的应急物资存储成本控制问题的研究 被引量:3

Storage Cost Control for Emergency Materials Based on Government and Enterprise Cooperation
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摘要 本文针对政府储备应急物资过期报废损失严重、存储成本高的问题,提出了政府委托企业储备应急物资的方案,并对委托合作后政府如何激励企业降低应急物资存储成本的问题进行了研究。首先对政府与企业合作前后应急物资储备成本进行了分析,寻找能使节约成本公平分配的条件,继而在企业尽最大努力降低应急物资存储成本的条件下,建立了政府成本节约期望效用最大化的激励模型。最后用算例验证了政府和企业合作后存储成本控制的问题。 In this paper,considering the problem that the emergency material storage causes out-of-date and high storage costs,we propose that government delegates enterprise as an agent of reserving emergency materials,and research the problem of controlling storage cost of the cooperation between the government and enterprise.First,this paper analyzes storage cost before and after cooperation,and looks into the condition of equitable allocation of cost savings after cooperation,then establishes incentive model aiming at the maximization of government’s cost-saving under the condition that enterprises try their best.Finally the numerical example proves storage cost control under the cooperation.
作者 丁斌 雷秀
出处 《西安电子科技大学学报(社会科学版)》 2010年第3期46-50,共5页 Journal of Xidian University:Social Science Edition
关键词 应急物资 储备成本 委托代理 分配 Emergency materials Storage cost Commission agents Allocation
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参考文献13

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