摘要
实证分析表明,目前的高首期佣金制度是一种"强规模"激励设计,诱使寿险代理人只注重扩大业务数量而忽视业务品质,建议延长佣金的发放时间,将首、续期佣金率适当均衡化;此外,研究结果也显示目前寿险代理人增员、培训、职业生涯规划激励效应弱化,有待进一步改进。
The results of our empirical analysis show that current first period commission system is a "strong scale" incentive design, which lures life insurance agents only to emphasize the quantity of business while ignoring the quality of business. The author's policy suggestion is to extend the commission's payment time and proportion first, renewal commission rate. Moreover, the results also show that the incentive mechanism of current training, recruiting, career planning is inefficient, which needs further improvement.
出处
《湖北经济学院学报》
2010年第4期48-53,共6页
Journal of Hubei University of Economics
基金
武汉市社会科学基金项目(09090)
湖北省教育厅人文社会科学研究项目(2010Z045)
关键词
寿险代理人
激励机制
激励效应
VAR模型
脉冲响应函数
life insurance agent
incentive mechanism
incentive effect
VAR models
impulse response function