期刊文献+

高校成果转化办公室激励契约设计分析 被引量:1

Analysis on the Incentive Contract Design of University Achievements Commercialization Offices
原文传递
导出
摘要 基于委托-代理理论,构建了高校成果转化办公室激励契约模型,探讨了高校与高校成果转化办公室之间的最优激励契约。结果表明,高校成果转化办公室的工作能力、工作意愿、风险规避度以及外界不确定性因素等对契约的设计具有重要影响,高校科技成果的转化效率与高校成果转化办公室的工作能力成平方正向增长关系,与其努力工作的意愿成正比,与其风险规避程度和外界不确定性因素成反比,同时,信息不对称条件下高校成果转化办公室的工作努力水平严格小于对称信息下的努力水平。 Based on principal-agent theory,an incentive contract model of university achievements commercialization offices(UACO) was constructed in this paper,and an optimal incentive contract between university and UACO was researched into.The conclusion indicates that many factors,such as working ability,working willingness,risk aversion degree of UACO,as well as the outside uncertain factors and so on,have important influences on the contract design.The efficiency of commercialization of university inventions has a squared forward growth relation with working ability,a direct proportion with working willingness,and has an inverse proportion with risk aversion degree of UACO and with outside uncertainty.Additionally,the level of hard working of UACO under the condition of information asymmetry is strictly less than that of information symmetry.
出处 《武汉理工大学学报》 CAS CSCD 北大核心 2010年第12期143-147,共5页 Journal of Wuhan University of Technology
基金 国家自然科学基金(70772074) 国家社会科学基金(BIA090049) 武汉市软科学项目(200940833375-03)
关键词 高校成果转化办公室 成果转化 委托-代理 激励契约 university achievements commercialization office(UACO) achievements commercialization principal-agent incentive contract
  • 相关文献

参考文献10

  • 1Leitch C M, Harrison R T. Maximising the Potential of University Spin-outs: the Development of Second-order Commercialisation Activities[J ]. R &D Management, 2005,35 (3) : 257-272.
  • 2Colm O' Gorman, Orla Byrne, Dipti Pandya. How Scientists Commercialise New Knowledge via Entrepreneurship[J]. Journal of Technology Transfer, 2008 (1) :23-43.
  • 3Donald S Siegel, David A Waldman, Leanne E Atwater, et al. Toward a Model of the Effective Transfer of Scientific Knowledge from Academicians to Practitioners:Qualitative Evidence from the Commercialization of University Technologies[J]. Journal of Engineering and Technology Management, 2004,21 (2):115-142.
  • 4Swamidas.s P M, Vulasa V. Why University Inventions Rarely Produce Income? Bottlenecks in University Technology Transfer[J]. Journal of Technology Transfer, 2009,34 (4) : 343-363.
  • 5Chapple W, Lockett A, Siegel D, et al. Assessing the Relative Performance of UK University Technology Transfer Offices: Parametric and Non-parametric Evidence[ J]. Research Policy, 2005,34 (3) : 369-384.
  • 6Markman G D, Gianiodis P T, Phan P H. Supply-side Innovation and Technology Commercialization[J]. Journal of Management Studies, 2009, 46(4): 625-649.
  • 7Mirrlees J. The Optimal Structure of Authority and Incentives Within an Organization[J]. Bell Journal of Economics, 1976, 7(8) : 105-131.
  • 8Holmstrom B. Moral Hazard and Observability[J]. Bell Journal of Economics, 1979, 10(12) :74-91.
  • 9黄鑫,陶小马,邢建武.基于委托-代理理论的节能契约设计[J].工业工程,2009,12(4):19-22. 被引量:4
  • 10Michael Balch,Daniel McFadden,Wu Shifyen. Essays on Economic Behavior Under Uncertainty[M]. Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1974.

二级参考文献11

共引文献3

同被引文献8

引证文献1

二级引证文献2

相关作者

内容加载中请稍等...

相关机构

内容加载中请稍等...

相关主题

内容加载中请稍等...

浏览历史

内容加载中请稍等...
;
使用帮助 返回顶部